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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Res Judicata
In Weiss v. Franklin Square and Munson Fire District,2 0 claimant was a
volunteer fireman injured while attending a parade and competitive drill in which
his company was engaged. After a denial of relief under the Workmen's Compensation Law, claimant brings this proceeding for compensation under the

General Municipal Law. The court unanimously reversing the Appellate Division,80
held, that the prior determination of the Workmen's Compensation Board that
claimant's injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment is not
res judicata in the instant proceeding.

The two applicable statutes, Workmen's Compensation Law §1031 and
General Municipal Law §205, subd. 3,82 differ in their scope of coverage; the
former applies only where the activity is a form of the employment and attendance
is compulsory, 33 while the latter specifically provides for compensation for injuries
incurred in performing a voluntary firemanic act which was authorized, permitted
or approved by a competent authority within the department. 3 4 The general rule
is that where injuries are not covered by Workmen's Compensation Law but are
covered by the broader provisions of another statute, the determination of the
Workmen's Compensation Board is not binding in a subsequent proceeding under
the other statute.3 5 Therefore, the issue at bar was not within the jurisdiction of
the Board, and their determination was not res judicata in the instant proceeding.a"
Although the case is correct on the procedural point in issue, it is to be noted
that there is authority contrary to allowing recovery by a volunteer fireman under
the General Municipal Law where his attendance at a drill or parade is voluntary.3 7
The criterion suggested in the opinion of the comptroller is that attendance must
29. 309 N. Y. 52, 127 N. E. 2d 804 (1955).

30. 283 App. Div. 1077, 131 N. Y. S. 2d 318 (2d Dep't 1954).
31 "Every employer subject to this chapter shall... secure compensation to
his employees ... for their disability or death from injury arising out of and in
the course of the employment without regard to fault as a cause of the injury."
32. "Any such volunteer fireman who shall receive injuries while performing
his duties as such... or while attending any drill or parade or inspection in which
his company or department is engaged... shall be reimbursed for such sums...
for medical . . . treatment. He shall also be compensated for the time he was
actually and necessarily prevented from following his vocation."
33. Niebrehr v. Board of Fire Commissioners,279 App. Div. 698, 108 N. Y. S. 2d
246 (3rd Dep't 1951).
34. Brown v. Towns of Gates and Ohili, 266 App. Div. 640, 44 N. Y. S. 2d 703
(4th Dept. 1943); affirmed 292 N. Y. 663, 56 N. E. 2d 94 (1944); see Note 32, supra.
35. Slattery v. Board of Estimate & Apportionment of City of New York, 271
N. Y. 346, 3 N. E. 2d 505 (1936).
36. Ogino v. Blaock, 304 N. Y. 872, 109 N. E. 2d 88 (1952).
37. 8 Op. State Compt. No. 5607 (1952).
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be under order of the Board of Fire Commissioners 38 to qualify for compensation
under either Workmen's Compensation Law or General Municipal Law, although
case law appears contra.39

Suicide
In Graham v. Nassau & Suffolk Lighting Company,40 an employee died by
falling into the stack of a superheater, the accident itself being unwitnessed. The
court held (4-3), reversing the Appellate Division41 and reinstating the award of
the Workmen's Compensation Board, that the presumption that this was an accidental injury and not suicide was not overcome by substantial evidence to the
contrary.
Workmen's Compensation Law §21 provides: "It shall be presumed in the
absence of substantial evidence to the contrary ... (3) that the injury was not
occasioned by the wilful intention of the injured employee to bring about the
injury or death of himself. . ." While this presumption may not substitute for
proof of accident, nevertheless it may be overcome only by substantial evidence to
the contrary. 42 Where there is such evidence the presumption fails, and the burden
43
reverts to the claimant.
The dissent,44 relying on the opinion in the Appellate Division, contends
that evidence in the form of a death certificate listing death as suicidal, a recent
divorce decree against the deceased, and the physical difficulties of falling accidentally into the superheater was such substantial evidence to the contrary. The
majority contends that the physical dimensions of the superheater did not make
an accident of this type improbable, and evidence of the lack of suicidal tendencies
on the part of the deceased, and of his plan to remarry after the divorce, made
motivation a question of fact for the Workmen's Compensation Board whose
45
decision was to be final
The instant case is illustrative of the difficulty the courts have had in deter38. Town Law §176 (11) authorizes the Board of Fire Commissioners to

provide for public inspections and parades.

39. See note 34, supra.

40. 308 N. Y. 140, 123 N. E. 2d 813 (1954).
41. 283 App. Div. 228, 126 N. Y. S. 2d 666 (3rd Dep't 1954).
42. Mcormack v. National City Bank of New York, 303 N. Y. 5, 94 N. E. 2d
887 (1951).
43. Magna v. Hagerman Harris Co., 258 N. Y. 82, 179 N. E. 266 (1932).
44. Lewis, C. J., and Fuld and Van Voorhis, JJ.
45. Workmen's Compensation Law §20 provides: ". . . the decision of the
Board shall be final as to all questions of fact."

mining when evidence reaches the level of "substantial evidence to the contrary,"

